

The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms

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This Paper

motivation

- ▶ Global fall in labor share well documented, but less well understood
- ▶ Investigating labor share using establishment micro data enables closer look into underlying economics

'superstar firm' hypothesis

- ▶ Many markets characterized by "winner-takes-most"
- ▶ Large firms with higher profits and lower labor share
- ▶ If globalization/technology increasingly favor industry leaders:
 - ⇒ market concentration ↑
 - ⇒ aggregate labor share ↓

Potential Explanations for Concentration

- ▶ Check Technology, Trade, business dynamism, computer investment, routine labor exposure
- ▶ Finding: mainly driven by technology

This Presentation & Relation to Our Series

- ▶ Paper on reading list due to emphasis on technology as driver in AER p&p version
- ▶ Focus in the end: empirical exploration of aggregate macroeconomic trends
- ▶ This focus ties into a growing literature
- ▶ Question in our context: *What are potential channels for technology to impact economy?*
- ▶ This presentation: overview of current macroeconomic trends
 - Autor et al. in detail
 - De Loecker and Eeckhout in brief
 - Common themes and relation to technology
 - Outlook

Autor et al. modeling framework: Sketch – Environment

- ▶ Value-added production function: $Y_i = A_i V_i^{1-\alpha} K_i^\alpha$
- ▶ TFPQ term A_i heterogeneous across firms
- ▶ Crucial: higher $A_i \rightarrow$ higher input levels, higher sales
- ▶ fixed cost in terms of labor F , i.e. total labor $L = V + F$
- ▶ factor markets perfectly competitive
- ▶ product markets imperfectly competitive
- ▶ fixed entry cost κ for drawing productivity parameter

Modeling framework: Sketch (2) – Labor Share

- ▶ from static FOC for labor, labor share in value added derived as

$$S_i \equiv \frac{wL_i}{P_iY_i} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\mu_i} + \frac{wF}{P_iY_i}$$

- ▶ Lower labor share if
 - higher markup \rightarrow generally constant or increasing in A_i , depending on model of competition
 - higher output \rightarrow generally increasing in A_i
- ▶ Generally: shocks favoring high A_i firms will skew distribution further and lower aggregate labor share, e.g.
 - increase in consumer sensitivity to price/quality
 - increase in fixed cost of production
 - increase in fixed cost of entry

Modeling framework: Sketch (3) – testable implications

- ▶ Version of the model: monopolistic competition
- ▶ Exercise: increase in product market competition – product substitutability $\rho \uparrow$
- ▶ Model predictions:
 1. within-industry sales concentration \uparrow
 2. fall in labor share mainly driven through between-firm reallocation rather than within-firm changes
 3. in industries with highest Δ in concentration, labor share will drop most
 4. effects should not be confined to the US

Data

- ▶ detailed US and (less) detailed international data
- ▶ here: focus on US
- ▶ quinquennial economic census, 1982-2012
 - 6 sectors:
 - manufacturing/retail/wholesale/services/finance/utilities
 - 80% of total private sector employment
 - assign plants to time consistent industry concordance based on 1987 sic codes
 - 676 industries, of which 388 manufacturing
 - variables (all industries): annual payroll, employment, output plus firm identifier
 - add. vars (manufacturing): value added
- ▶ additional data:
 - KLEMS data for European countries plus for US intermediate inputs (services)
 - comtrade data on imports to adjust for size of domestic market
 - ECB CompNet data, firm level, covering European markets
 - Orbis data on european countries

Empirical Methodology

Correlation analysis

- ▶ Regress labor shares on sales concentration changes

$$\Delta S_{jt} = \alpha \Delta CONC_{jt} + \tau_t + u_{jt}$$

- τ_t full set of time dummies
- standard error clustered at industry level

Decomposition of changes

- ▶ Establish importance of within- and between-firm changes in labor shares
- ▶ Define aggregate labor share in levels as

$$S = \sum \omega_i S_i = \bar{S} + \sum (\omega_i - \bar{\omega})(S_i - \bar{S})$$



- ω_i : firm's share in industry value-added, $\sum \omega_i = 1$
- \bar{S} unweighted mean industry labor share

- ▶ In changes:





$$\Delta S = S_2 - S_1 = \underbrace{\Delta \bar{S}}_{\text{within}} + \underbrace{\Delta \sum (\omega_i - \bar{\omega})(S_i - \bar{S})}_{\text{between}}$$

Evidence 1: Labor Share Concentration – Manuf/Finance

Figure 3: Average Payroll-to-Sales Ratio




Evidence 1: Labor Share Concentration – other sectors




Evidence 2: Sales Concentration

Figure 4: Average Concentration Across Four Digit Industries by Major Sector




Evidence 3: Labor Share and Firm Size

Figure 5: The Relationship Between Firm Size and Labor Share




Evidence 4: Δ Labor Share and Δ Concentration

Figure 6: The Relationship Between the Change in Labor Share and the Change in Concentration Across Six Sectors




Evidence 5: Decomposition of Δ Labor Share

Figure 9: Melitz-Polanez Decomposition of the Change in Labor Share in Manufacturing




Evidence 6: Relating Δ LS, Δ Conc. to between-within

Figure 11: Regressions of the Components of the Change in Labor Share on the Change in Concentration



Evidence 7: Explaining $\text{Corr}(\Delta \text{LS}, \Delta \text{Concentration})$

Figure 14: Change in Concentration in U.S. Manufacturing and Change in Industry Characteristics



Evidence 8: Explaining $\text{Corr}(\Delta \text{LS}, \Delta \text{Concentration})$

Table A.6: The Labor Share and the Rise in Chinese Imports

	Sales (1)	Wages (2)	Value Added (3)	CR4 (4)	CR20 (5)	HHI (6)	Labor Share (7)	Payroll- to-Sales (8)
OLS Estimates								
<u>Sample 1: 1992-2012</u>								
5 year Changes	-1.967 ** (0.76)	-0.485 ~ (0.28)	-0.805 * (0.36)	0.563 (4.66)	0.234 (5.11)	1.630 (2.12)	7.070 * (3.16)	2.034 (1.85)
10 year Changes	-1.717 * (0.75)	-0.487 (0.67)	-1.026 (0.89)	-12.514 (10.48)	-2.577 (11.80)	-4.780 (4.20)	13.634 ** (3.16)	5.506 (3.54)
IV Estimates								
<u>Sample 1: 1992-2012</u>								
5 year Changes	-3.693 ** (1.42)	-0.855 * (0.36)	-1.156 ** (0.42)	6.027 (5.07)	4.765 (4.94)	6.814 * (3.38)	6.695 * (3.24)	2.457 (1.83)
10 year Changes	-4.553 ** (1.75)	-1.043 (0.80)	-1.788 ~ (0.98)	-1.973 (13.60)	11.178 (13.76)	4.962 (7.49)	16.375 ** (3.24)	8.067 * (3.72)
<u>Sample 2: 1992-2007</u>								
5 year Changes	-2.667 ** (1.00)	-1.125 ** (0.41)	-1.237 ** (0.42)	16.295 ~ (9.00)	10.442 * (4.56)	12.681 * (5.90)	0.321 (3.24)	-1.29 (1.48)
10 year Changes	-3.024 ** (1.01)	-1.961 ** (0.73)	-2.314 ** (0.81)	20.47 (15.22)	11.974 ~ (6.99)	18.405 * (9.22)	6.443 (6.05)	0.21 (1.70)

Trade and IV Strategy

- ▶ Previous evidence links labor shares and import intensity (Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin, 2013, Brookings)
- ▶ Redo this exercise here, focus on manufacturing data
- ▶ Same IV strategy as in Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013, AER)
 - Instrument US import shares from China with Chinese import shares of 8 European countries
 - Underlying concern: import shares correlated with industry demand shock
 - since demand shock likely to have direct employment impact, OLS estimates potentially biased
 - Aim with IV: focus on variation in Chinese import demand driven by Chinese supply shocks, orthogonal to US demand
- ▶ positive result opposite of EHS13
- ▶ explanation: main driver manufacturing as opposed to trade

Conclusion & Comments

Conclusion

- ▶ Investigate fall in labor share using firm level data
- ▶ Sketch a model of 'superstar firms' as explanation
- ▶ Show that micro data patterns support predictions from the theory
- ▶ potential explanation: technology driven

Comments

- ▶ primarily descriptive paper
- ▶ underlying economic mechanisms only touched upon
- ▶ complementary literature also pointing to firms as drivers

Complementary literature: De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017)

- ▶ estimate markups for public US firms since 1960s
- ▶ Findings:
 - markups have gone up from 20% up to 1980 to $> 60\%$ in 200s
 - economy wide, driven by small firms
 - within industries, driven by large firms
 - indicates that firm size distribution differs across industries
 - markup increase driven by top end of markup distribution, i.e. high markup firms increase markups even further.
- ▶ Explanations: Market power vs technology
 - variable vs fixed costs of production
 - but: profit measures tightly related to markups
- ▶ Like Autor et al.: Market concentration story

Why has concentration/market power gone up?

- ▶ Open question
- ▶ loose list of speculative answers
 - Increased rate of innovation: first-mover advantage
 - Increased importance of network goods
 - Deregulation
 - ...
- ▶ How might AI/technological progress come into play?
 - (potentially large) fixed cost of adoption
 - access to training data
 - scalability

How to move on from here? Bigger Picture

How to define AI/technological progress?

- ▶ Literature so far: AI does things only humans could do
 - task based framework, focus on labor markets
 - race between HK/machines, looming immiseration
 - more: e.g. Sachs and coauthors (2012, 2015)
- ▶ Potential alternative: AI makes capital *more flexible*
 - already happening: 3D-printing, platform based cars, etc.
 - implications for product differentiation/customization → consumer surplus?
 - implications for boundary of the firm/IO/market structure?
 - possible framework?

How to move on from here? Next presentations

- ▶ forthcoming NBER volume from recent conference on AI and Economics <http://papers.nber.org/books/agra-1>

Literature

- [1] [[1]]David Autor, David Dorn, Lawrence F Katz, Christina Patterson, John Van Reenen, et al. The fall of the labor share and the rise of superstar firms. Technical report, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, 2017.
- [2] [[2]]H David, David Dorn, and Gordon H Hanson. The china syndrome: Local labor market effects of import competition in the united states. *The American Economic Review*, 103(6):2121–2168, 2013.
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- [6] [[6]]Jeffrey D. Sachs and Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Smart machines and long-term misery. Working Paper 18629, National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2012.